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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES -ADMISSIBILITY OF EVI-
DENCE OBTAINED THROUGH UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE - Defendants 
were prosecuted and convicted of conspiring to engage in horserace book-
making and related offenses. The police had secured evidence of defend-
ants' activities by concealing a listening device in premises occupied by 
them and also by unauthorized and forcible searches. The trial court ad-
mitted the evidence so obtained, notwithstanding the fact that the police 
action in securing it was clearly in violation of both federal and state con-
stitu tions1 and statutes.2 After conviction, the trial court denied defendants' 
motion for a new trial. On appeal, held, reversed, three justices _dissenting. 
Evidence obtained in violation of the defendants' constitutional rights is 
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. People v. Cahan, (Cal. 1955) 282 
P. (2d) 905. 
The problem of admissibility of evidence obtained through unlawful 
search and seizure has been considered by courts in virtually every juris-
diction.3 At common law, the general rule was. that such evidence was 
admissible,4 the courts reasoning that the means of procurement did not 
effect its probative value.5 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States condemns unlawful searches and seizures, but does not 
expressly deal with the question of whether the fruits of such activity shall 
constitute admissible evidence.6 However, the federal courts have long held 
that evidence obtained by action in violation of that amendment is inad-
missible. 7 In Wolf v. Colorado8 the Court held that while the Fourteenth 
Amendment makes the prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures 
l U.S. CONST., amend. IV; CAL. CoNST., art. I, §19. 
218 U.S.C. (1952) §§241, 242; Cal. Penal Code (Deering, 1949) §146. 
3 Appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 at 33, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949). 
4 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2183 (1940). 
5 This position was distinguished from those cases involving coerced confessions, which 
were felt to be inherently unreliable. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §815 et seq. (1940). 
6 The constitutions of every state contain provisions either exactly like or substan-
tially similar to the Fourth Amendment. See CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 2d ed., §2 
(1930), where such provisions are quoted for every state except New York, which adopted 
one in 1938. N.Y. CONST., art. I, §12. 
7 The rule was first suggested in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1886), 
and was laid down in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914). 
s Note 3 supra. See Allen, "The ·wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and 
the Civil Liberties,'' 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950). 
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applicable to the states, it does not require that the states exclude evidence 
obtained by such action. Later, the Court modified this concept by holding 
that the presence of physical force would change the result.9 In Irvine v. 
Calif ornia,1° a case also involving the use of a listening device, a closely 
divided Court reaffirmed the Wolf decision and did not require that the 
state court exclude the evidence. Prior to the decision in the principal case, 
California had rejected the federal rule and admitted unlawfully obtained 
evidence.11 In reversing its stand and adopting the exclusionary rule, the 
court in the principal case admits that neither the federal nor state12 con-
stitution requires exclusion, and that it is laying down "a judicially declared 
rule of evidence."13 The court gives two reasons for its holding. First, it 
reads the Wolf and Irvine cases as an invitation to the states to reexamine 
their positions on the question. Secondly, the court indicates that, as a 
matter of policy, the federal exclusionary rule is the only effective sanction 
against constitutional violations by police officers. Strong policy arguments 
can be made in support of either side of the admissibility problem, but it 
is essentially a question of balancing the social desirability of apprehending 
criminals against the protection of the individual's right to privacy.14 At 
the time of the Wolf decision thirty-one states had held evidence obtained 
through unlawful search and seizure admissible; sixteen had held it inad-
missible.15 However, two of the states. which had judicially rejected the 
exclusionary rule have now adopted it by statute,16 as has the heretofore 
uncommitted jurisdictie>n.17 Since the Wolf case numerous courts have had 
9 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952). 
10 347 U.S. 128, 74 S.Ct. 381 (1954). Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Burton 
dissented, the latter two on the ground that concealing a listening device in a bedroom 
was sufficiently shocking to bring this case closer to Rochin v. California, note 9 supra, 
than to Wolf v. Colorado, note 3 supra. Cf. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 
62 S.Ct. 993 (1942). 
11 People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 p_ 435 (1922). For the most recent statement 
of this view, see In re Dixon, 41 Cal. (2d) 756, 264 P. (2d) 513 (1953). 
12 CAL. CONST., art. I, §19, contains language similar to that of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
13 Principal case at 910. 
14 The policy arguments are beyond the scope of this note. On the side of admis-
sibility, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2183, 2184 (1940); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 
13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926); Waite, "Reasonable Search and Research," 86 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 
623 (1938); Waite, "Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence," 42 MICH. L. REv. 679 
(1944); Harno, "Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure,'' 19 ILL. L. REv. 303 
(1925); Plumb, "Illegal Enforcement of the Law," 24 CoRN. L. Q. 337 (1939). On the 
side of exclusion, see Allen, "The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the 
Civil Liberties," 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950); 33 N.C. L. REv. 100 (1954); 58 YALE L. J. 144 
(1948). 
15 Appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, note 3 supra. 
16 N.C .. Gen. Stat. (1953) §§15-27; Te.x. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1941; Supp. 1953) 
§727a. See also Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 35, §§5, 5A (limiting the exclusionary 
rule to prosecutions for misdemeanors); Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1953) tit. 29, §210 (making 
evidence illegally obtained inadmissible in prosecutions for unlawful possession of liquor 
in a private dwelling). 
17 R.I. Acts & Resolves (1955) c. 3590. Cal. Penal Code (Deering, 1949) §653h pro-
vides for criminal penalties for anyone, other than an authorized police officer, making 
use of a listening device or secretly intercepting conversations. The court in the prin-
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an opportunity to reexamine their holdings, but only one has, like Cali-
fornia, reversed a prior admissibility rule.18 Thus, admissibility is still the 
majority position, but not to the extent that it once was. It should be 
pointed out that the reversal of position by the California court involves a 
change of mind by only two judges.19 It may be that the new majority 
questions the durability of the Wolf-Irvine line of authority,20 and does not 
want to risk a possible overruling of those cases. The court in the principal 
case admits that future difficulties may arise in the administration of the 
federal rule and its many exceptions,21 but states that the absence of other 
effective sanctions against unlawful searches and seizures justifies exclu-
sion.22 A more satisfactory solution to the problem would be legislation, 
either spelling out the exclusionary rule in sufficient detail that police 
officers will know how to conduct themselves, or, preferably, providing other 
effective sanctions against constitutional violations.23 
Neil Flanagin, S.Ed. 
cipal case interpreted the clause to relieve authorized police officers from the operation 
of that section, but not to legalize their acts in violation of the constitution. 
18 Richards v. State, 45 Del. 573, 17 A. (2d) 199 (1950), overruling State v. Chuchola, 
32 Del. 133, 120 A. 212 (1922). For decisions from 1949 to 1953, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 
3d ed., §2183 (1940; Supp. 1953). Since then Illinois has reaffirmed its exclusionary rule 
in People v. Perry, I Ill. (2d) 482, 116 N.E. (2d) 360 (1953), and New Jersey has re-
affirmed its admissibility rule in In re 301-317 Clinton Ave., Newark, N.J., 35 N.J. Super. 
136, 113 A. (2d) 208 (1955). Courts in the British Commonwealth generally follow the 
admissibility rule, but there has been some divergence from this view in recent years. 
See Cowen, "The Admissibility of Evidence Procured Through Illegal Searches and 
Seizures in British Commonwealth Jurisdictions," 5 VAND. L. REv. 523 (1952); Williams, 
"Evidence Obtained by Illegal Means," 1955 CRIM. L. REv. 339. 
19 The principal case was a 4-to-3 decision. Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., joined 
the two judges who dissented in In re Dixon, note 11 supra, to make up a new majority. 
20 See note IO supra. Justice Clark reluctantly went along with the majority, feeling 
bound by the Wolf case, but expressed dissatisfaction with the present rule. See 7 Au. 
L. REv. 156 (1954). 
21 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2184 (1940); 33 TEX. L. REv. 122 (1954). 
22 Principal case at 911. 
23 The possibility of state criminal or civil prosecution, or federal criminal prosecu-
tion under 18 U.S.C. (1952) §§241, 242, or a civil action under Rev. Stat. (1874) §1979, 
42 U.S.C. (1952) §1983, are generally not felt to be a sufficient deterrent. See 38 CALIF. 
L. ?lE"· 498 (1950); 7 STAN. L. REv. 76 (1954). 
